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Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from jury verdict of guilty in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, presiding, 
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Attorney General, 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs. - ) 
RAYMOND STROHM, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11166 
STATI£MENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty to 
t!w crimes of Burglary in the Third Degree and Grand 
Laret>ny. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury found the defendant guilty of Burglary in 
the Third Degree and Grand Larceny. He was sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as 
provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the jury verdict ren-
dered against him, or in the alternative, to grant him a 
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2 
new trial ·with instructions in accordance with the point 
raised on appeal. 
f\T A '11E~fKN'l1 O"U' FACTS 
The appellant was convicted of Burglary in the 
Third Degree and Grand Larceny after trial by jury. 
']_'he victim of thP alleged offense was Delivery Service 
and Transfer Company of Salt Lake City, Utah. (T-3) 
The State's case rested upon the appellant's recent 
possession of an electric typewriter and postage meter 
taken from the victim's establishment (T-7) plus an 
alleged confession of the appellant. (T-21). 
The appellant made an explanation of his possession 
of the items before the jury. (T-43) He testified that he 
took no part in the burglary of Transfer Service (T-43) 
hut rather items in question had bePn brought to him by 
l\fike .Martine>z and Ernie Gallegos. (T-40) He testified 
that he ,,-as ask<'<l li~- thosP two men to s<'ll thE~ type-
writer for $!)0. 
During the trial, Nick Palukos, an investigating of-
ficer with the Salt Lake City Police Department was 
called to the stand. (T-21 ). He testified that he inter-
Yi<'W<'<l tlw ap]H•llant on .Jul~- 1 :Hit or 14th in the Salt 
Lab· Co1tnt~- Jail (T-:21 ), ,,·hen• tlH· ddPndant was being 
h<'l<l on anotlH1r rharge. (T-20) 
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After a technically incomplete Miranda warning, 
('11-19) the officer testified that he concluded that the 
r)pfendant understood yd waived his rights (T-21). This 
1rns in :,;pite of the fact that the defendant was visibly 
ill from narcotic withdrawal (T-22). He was so ill, in 
fact, that the officer stopped interrogating him after a 
short time and told him that he would return the next 
day (T-21). vVhen Palukos returned, the defendant de-
elinPd to talk further (T-21). 
During the interrogation and before its termination 
because of the defendant's illness, the officer obtained 
a confession or admission from the defendant to the ef-
fect that he along with Michael Walker and Ursel Harris 
(not :Martinez and Gallegos) had gone to the Delivery 
Service and Transfer building (T-23, 24). The defendant 
had stayed in the car while the other men entered the 
hnilding. They returned with the property and placed 
it in tlw rar and left tlw scenP (T-23). 
At trial, the above admission was admitted in evi-
rlPnce over an objection to its being involuntary. (T-22-
~3) rl'lw trial judge ruled that, "as to whether or not 
\\'hat he said was voluntary, is a question for the jury. 
rndPr the circumstances that this has developed here 
... whPth<>r rnlnntan or roerced will be a matter for 
tlH' jnr>, tn c1ut<'rmi1w." (T-'.?:"l). 
,\ t trial, tlH' appellant took tlw stand in his own lw-
liaJJ'. ('l'-3~)). (rl'-42) r1_111e appellant recalls having a con-
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versation with Officer Palukos in the jail but can't recall 
what he told him. He indicated that at the time, he was 
sick from narcotic withdrawal and felt that the officer 
was threatening him and putting words in his mouth. 
('l1-43, 44). He further testified that he felt that Officer 
Palukos had the incident mixed up (T-47) with others 
under investigation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE 
VOLUNTARINESS OF THE APPELLANT'S CONFESSION 
BEFORE ALLOWING THE SAME TO BE HEARD BY THE 
JURY. 
It is submitted that the Trial Court conunitted pri>· 
judicial error requiring reversal in ruling that the ques-
tion of the voluntariness of a confession is for the jury. 
In so ruling, the• trial court violated not only the de-
fendant's right to Dm· Process hut also the procedural 
rul1>s srt down h:-.' this court. 
In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 
12 L. FM 2d 908 (19G4), the United State Supreme Court 
~;1•t do\\'TI comditutional .~·nid1•hws for thP procedurr rela-
tivP to ddermi11inµ; nJlnntariiwss of a eonfrssion. ~'he 
Court hrld that tlH' N<'w York procechm~ for determining 
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voluntariness of a confession offered by the prosecution 
violated the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The Kew York procedure that was struck down was as 
follows: the trial court excluded the confession if it could 
in no circumstance be deemed voluntary, but left to the 
jury the ultimate determination of its voluntary charac-
ter, as ·well as its truthfulness, if the evidence presented 
a fair qnestion as to its voluntariness. The underlying 
rational of the decision was that a jury could not be as-
sumed to have reliably found a confession voluntary 
wlwrP it also detPrminPs its truthfulness. 
It is submitted that the trial judge's ruling creates 
a procC'dme that violates the underlying principle of the 
Jackson v. Denno decision in a manner far worse than 
tlw NPw York procedure struck down in that case. 
Here the trial judge after hearing substantial evi-
dPncP to the effect that the defendant's confession might 
have lH'en involuntanc and over objection of counsel, 
rnlPd that the question was solely for the jury. The Court 
tl1en·h~· refusC'd to have a fnll hearing on the question 
of tlw volnntariness of the confession and refused to rule 
wlwtlH·r thP confession in no circumstance could be deem-
rd voluntary. The unconstitutional New York procedure 
would at l0m:t hav<' r0cp1ired that much. It is, therefore, 
~uhmittPd that this procednre denied the appellant Dne 
T'1·n(0 ('ss of ht\\· as gnarant<'<'d h~· the 14th Amendment 
id" tit<> FnitPd Rtatc•s Constitution nndPr Jackson 1;. 
/)1·11111!. 
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It is fnrtlwr argnPd that by the trial court's ruling, 
the appellant was denied procedural Due Process under 
the laws of thP State of Utah. 
The court long ago set forth the procedure to be 
followed by the lesser court of this state in determining 
the volnntarinPss of an admission or confession of a 
criminal defendant before submitting the same to a jmy. 
In State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178 (1943), 
the court, following what is known as tlw "'Vigrnort''" 
or "Orthodox" rule, held that the trial judge is to hear 
all the evidence and then rule on the same for tlw pnr-
pose of admissibility of the confesRion. If further held 
that the jury iR only to consider voluntariness as it af-
fects, wPight or credibility of the confession. This conrt 
has cited tlw ml<> with approval in StatP i:. Mares, 113 
Ptah 225, 192 P. 2d 8(i1 (1948); State L Braascl1, m 
Ptah 450, 229 P. 2d 289 (1951) and Stafp r. Ashdou•11. 5 
T~. 2cl :l9, 29G P. 2d 12G (19!1G). 
Tt is pat<'ntl~- c•vident from tlw record that th<' trial 
<'ourt did not follo\\· the ahov<' procedure. Rather, hy 
failing to rnlP on the volnntarin<•ss of tlw confession and 
snhmitting the same to the jury, the trial court violated 
the ,,·ell <>stahlis}1Pcl Ptah procPdurP. This patPnt viola-
tion r],•:nl~- n·<111i r<·s t11is conrt to n•\«•rs<> tliP C'Onvirtion 
!ll' rl:1· ap]'< ll:ud. 
: Sre :1 Wigrnoi·r, E\·idenc<' ~8Gl. (:1rd ed. 1940). 
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CONCLUSION 
'l'he record clearly indicated that the appellant's con-
fession was erroneously allowed to be heard by the jury 
before ruling on the voluntariness of the same. This ac-
tion was contrary to that required to justify due process 
of law under the 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and the recognized Utah Procedure. This 
error clearly requires this court to reverse the action of 
the court below and grant the appellant the relief sought 
on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID M. BOWN 
231 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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